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Research Note 
Persuasion and Coercion in the  
Clientelistic Exchange:  
A Survey of Four Argentine Provinces 
Carlos M. Lisoni 
Abstract: How do political parties guarantee enforcement of a clientelis-
tic exchange? This research note empirically supports a catalog of clien-
telism compliance enforcement tactics. It also suggests that by focusing 
on the personalization of tactics and the constraints they place on indi-
vidual voters, we can evaluate how intrusive these tactics are and further 
help to bridge existing instrumentalist and reciprocity theories of client 
compliance. The supporting evidence comes from interviews carried out 
with 73 elected Argentine local and provincial officials. How persuasive 
or coercive the tactics need to be to make clients comply with their part 
of the bargain has implications for our understanding of the legitimacy 
of the clientelistic bondage and our assessment of the roles of patrons 
and brokers in such exchanges. 
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Introduction 
Clientelism is pervasive in many new democracies. It is based on patrons 
(usually politicians) giving clients (usually voters) particularistic benefits 
(e.g., money, food, and favors) in exchange for electoral support (e.g., 
votes). This practice requires that political parties use different forms of 
communication with voters, various amounts of resources, and different 
types of organization according to the setting. At least two distinct party 
activities can be identified in clientelism, irrespective of the context of 
the clientelistic exchange: giving (or promising) benefits to voters (this 
may require prior knowledge of the district and voters via local brokers) 
and enforcing the exchange with a range of, what I term, compliance 
enforcement tactics (CETs), which include monitoring,1 vote-buying, or 
turnout-buying, inter alia. This research note focuses on the mechanisms 
of this latter party activity.  
The comparative literature explores different aspects of the clien-
telistic relationship. Susan Stokes (2005) and Brusco, Nazareno, and 
Stokes (2004) examine “vote-buying” in Argentina, arguing that party 
operatives can observe and make inferences from voters’ attitudes and 
behavior (also see Auyero 2001). Nichter (2008) argues that “turnout-
buying” is a better explanation of Stokes’ evidence. In fact, both are 
aspects of a clientelistic exchange (see Stokes et al. 2013; also, on en-
forcement see Stokes 2005; Calvo and Murillo 2004).2 
CETs can vary in the degree to which they intrude on an individual 
client’s voting process. Intrusiveness refers to the party’s interference 
with the voter’s autonomy to vote freely (e.g., Dahl 1996: 645). From a 
political party perspective, costly CETs – such as monitoring tactics – 
would ideally not be needed, because clients would fulfill their part of the 
bargain and support the patron as a matter of reciprocity. Political par-
ties’ limited capacity to monitor voters may also be a reason for the ab-
sence of more intrusive tactics (Lawson and Greene 2014: 69). Indeed, 
some authors argue that there is a “norm of reciprocity,” “reciprocal 
obligation” (Lawson and Greene 2014: 61), and loyalty (Lomnitz 1988: 7, 
on “subordination,” 47; Auyero 2000: 73; also see Neufeld and Campa-
nini 1996; Roniger 1997; Trotta 2003: 146). I see client reciprocity as the 
consequence of multiple and/or significant positive interactions between 
                                                 
1  A variety of definitions of “monitoring voters” are provided by Medina and 
Stokes (2007: 82), Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 8, 19), Larreguy Arbesu 
(2012), and Lawson and Greene (2014). 
2  Works like Szwarcberg’s (2013) focus instead on client mobilization to political 
rallies. 
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the patron and client. For example, a voter may feel compelled to vote 
for a patron-politician who paid for his daughter’s surgery.3 Political 
parties invest time and resources to benefit particular voters in order to 
generate reciprocal obligation among clients. Recognizing this role of 
political parties complements instrumentalist theories that focus on the 
monitoring and threatening tactics employed to make clients respect the 
clientelistic contract (e.g., Szwarcberg 2013). Client compliance may be 
achieved through a variety of tactics, ranging from deeds and gestures 
(which generate feelings of reciprocity) to coercion and intimidation. I 
argue that a CET’s degree of intrusiveness toward a client depends on 
how personalized (as opposed to how anonymous) and how intimidating 
the tactic is. Hence, political parties achieve client compliance with both 
persuasion and coercion.  
Qualitative case-study research provides the best accounts and de-
scriptions of the tactics (the processes and meaning involved) used by 
political parties to enforce clientelistic exchanges (e.g., see Auyero 1997, 
2001; Álvarez-Rivadulla 2012; Lazar 2004; Urquiza 2005 and Zarazaga 
2014) Yet, there is no systematic study of CETs; most studies are based 
on, and thus biased toward, large and/or relatively wealthier cities and 
districts. 
Case Selection, Method, and Data 
This study uses qualitative data obtained from 73 semistructured inter-
views containing open-ended questions posed to local and provincial 
elected officials. I make descriptive inferences based on four provincial 
cases with sample sizes of 15–20 interviews each and then suggest indi-
cators to measure how personalized and how coercive those practices 
were to voters.  
  
                                                 
3  Survey data gathered by Lawson and Greene (2014: 65) supports this argument.  
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Table 1.  Provinces’ Electoral Competitiveness (ESOP) and Socioeconom-
ic Development (HDI), 1996 
HDI Low 
0.764 
High
0.843 
High
0.820 
Low
0.799 
ESOP Low 
0.28 
Low
0.24 
High
0.49 
High
0.45 
Formosa Santa Cruz Mendoza Catamarca
Table 2. Populations of Localities of Local-Level Interviewees (Index 2001) 
Formosa Population Santa Cruz Population 
Formosa 198,074 Río Gallegos 79,144 
Pirané 19,124 Caleta Olivia 36,077 
El Colorado 12,780 Pico Truncado 14,985 
Las Lomitas 10,354 28 de Noviembre 4,686 
Ibarreta 8,687 Comandante Luis Piedrabuena 4,176 
Laguna Blanca 6,508 Perito Moreno 3,588 
San Francisco de 
Laishí 4,384 Puerto Santa Cruz 3,397 
Laguna Naick-
Neck 2,115 Los Antiguos 2,047 
    
Mendoza (capi-
tal) 
Population 
(capital pop.) 
Catamarca Population 
Guaymallén (Villa 
Nueva) 251,339 (31,695) 
San Fernando del 
Valle de Catamarca 141,260 
San Rafael (San 
Rafael) 173,571 (99,615) Valle Viejo 23,707 
Ciudad de Men-
doza  110,993 Tinogasta 14,509 
Luján de Cuyo 
(Luján de Cuyo) 104,470 (26,567) 
Fray Mamerto 
Esquiú 10,658 
Junín (Junín) 35,045 (8,478) Los Varela 1,908 
Tupungato (Tu-
pungato) 28,539 (11,687) La Puerta 1,067 
Note:  The cities I did not visit are in italics. Also, mayors (intendentes) in Mendoza 
are the executives for their entire counties (departamentos), which may include 
several towns and rural areas. 
I conducted field research in 23 localities with as little as 1,067 inhabit-
ants in four Argentine provinces (Catamarca, Formosa, Mendoza, and 
Santa Cruz) between March and November 2006. The four districts are 
diverse in terms of electoral competitiveness (Effective Strength of Op-
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position Parties, ESOP)4 and socioeconomic development (Human De-
velopment Index, HDI) (see tables 1, 2, and 3).5 Next I examine what 
type of CETs are employed in the four selected districts; I identify and 
illustrate seven types of tactics. 
Table 3. Interviews Conducted with Elected Officials 
 Party of 
provincial 
governor 
PJ UCR UCR PJ  
      
 For-
mosa 
Cata-
marca 
Men-
doza 
Santa 
Cruz 
TO-
TAL 
Mayor Ruling party 5 3 2 1 11 
Opposition  2 2 2 6 
City Legis-
lator 
Ruling party 2 5 2 6 15 
Opposition 3 1 5 5 14 
Provincial 
Legislator 
Ruling party 3 4 4 4 15 
Opposition 2 4 4 2 12 
TOTAL (women) 15 (2) 19 (7) 19 (1) 20 (5) 73 (15) 
Note:  There were no opposition mayors in Formosa at the time of field research. 
Catamarca: Persuasion and Coercion to  
Enforce Compliance 
Here, I illustrate the pervasiveness of clientelism in Catamarca and pro-
vide accounts of specific CETs. Clientelism is characterized by the large 
quantity and the last-minute distribution of particularistic benefits, such 
as money, food, and job promises, among other things. Deputy Victor 
Brandán, a Peronist in the UCR-led Frente Cívico y Social (FCyS), had 
this to say:  
                                                 
4  I show elsewhere how Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) Effective Number of 
Competing Parties (ENCP) is an inappropriate proxy for competitiveness and 
how the Effective Strength of Opposition Parties (ESOP) index is more ap-
propriate (Lisoni 2012). My measure averages competitiveness for all guberna-
torial elections in the period 1987–2003. On the relevance of focusing on gu-
bernatorial elections instead of local elections, see (Lisoni 2017: 146). 
5  To further verify the “capacity” of citizens in the four cases, see the GADIS 
(2004) study on the development of civil society in Argentina, which generally 
supports my classification of cases. It found that Formosa has “Little relevance 
of an associative tradition” and a “very low level of citizenship participation,” 
that Catamarca has “low institutional articulation and participation in net-
works” and “Low citizen participation,” that Mendoza has “High coverage and 
citizenship participation,” and that Santa Cruz has a “Very high level of institu-
tional articulation and participation in networks” but only “Moderate citizen-
ship participation.” 
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I am not saying it happens all over the province. I mean, people 
from downtown [the provincial capital] and the middle class or 
richer are very difficult to buy with a bag [of food], a bed, and a 
pair of shoes. But I do not think that is actually buying the vote. 
For people sleeping on the floor, all of a sudden, somebody shows 
up. It might be a politician or not, because it could be someone 
from an NGO giving them a bed, a mattress, shoes. It is likely that 
people will be eternally grateful […]. And if later that person asks 
them to support his candidacy with a vote, they will do it because 
they are grateful for the solution he brought. […] Oh well, it is 
part of the idiosyncrasy, part of the tradition related to the way of 
doing politics in these regions […] we believe are not proper. But 
it should be agreed among all political parties. If someone decides 
not to use the methodology of handing out things, then all parties 
should decide not to do so. Because otherwise, if handing out 
things allows you to win, undoubtedly it would not be fair play.  
Deputy Salcedo (Unión Cívica Radical, UCR) characterized giving bene-
fits as part of their job as politicians, while acknowledging the quid pro 
quo that:  
Even if it is an exchange, a vote for a gift […] If we say we are 
politicians and want to improve people’s lives, giving things to 
people is not a whim. […] People know they can request things 
during a campaign. During a campaign things are often handed 
out without organization, which could produce better results if it 
were officially organized during a term of office. […] But people 
do not get this idea of “process.” The positive effect is achieved in 
the last five days of the campaign. 
Senator Figueroa (Peronist) argued that “One can campaign without 
money, but if one wants to campaign to win, then you need money. 
People need solutions right then, not later.” Councilwoman Stella Ramos 
(Valle Viejo, UCR) pointed out that: 
When you go to a home to ask for a vote, I think that 70 percent 
ask for some material benefit for themselves: a job, funds for their 
kid who is a student, construction materials for the house, or med-
icines.  
Mayor Humberto Valdez (Fray Mamerto Esquiú, UCR) made a similar 
point, contending that: 
There are groups that make the most of it. “If you come, don’t 
come empty-handed.” What do they ask for? Beds, mattresses, 
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shoes, some bags of food. It is the most common thing […] to all 
parties though, “If you don’t bring anything, don’t show up!” 
Mayor Marcelo Saavedra (Los Varela, PJ) seemingly defended this prac-
tice, arguing that: 
The issue of gifts [dádiva] will always exist […] but we think that 
[giving a person] a contract making 150–200 pesos [a month], at 
least to survive, [is better than nothing]. [Helping] is what politics 
is for; it is not just to fill your pockets [llenarse el bolsillo]. 
In fact, Mayor Javier Morra (La Puerta, PJ) claimed that he “send[s] 
people house to house, see[s] the needs, and […] solve[s] the problems 
from the municipality.” Meanwhile, Senator Jesús Albarracín (PJ) said he:  
visited every 15 days. We went up [the mountain], brought medi-
cines and we distributed them monthly. That’s what people see 
[…] Those from the Frente Cívico [incumbent coalition] do not 
go to the mountains [los cerros], only when they need the vote. And 
they bring quicklime, cement, corrugated iron.  
These accounts show that machine clientelism is practiced openly and is 
admittedly effective.  
Cash on Site 
According to Senator Figueroa: 
You cannot buy 7,000 votes, it is impossible. But you can buy 50 
to 100 votes, which in the end decide the election. In 2005 we 
were comfortably winning until 4 or 5 p.m., and the mayor got a 
phone call saying, “You are losing the election. Why don’t you go 
and take your place?” And he did with a briefcase. […] We lost in 
a constituency of 7,000 by only 200 in the last stretch. The mayor 
beat us because he spent ARS 50,000 in the last half hour. He 
stood up at the school and simply paid for votes.  
Figueroa’s anecdote shows how close elections can be and also that po-
litical machines have the capacity to monitor how people vote. It also 
reveals that a mayor avoided prosecution despite his questionable and 
intimidating actions. This behavior would only need to affect the votes 
of a small number of clients to be effective. As Councilwoman Lia Qui-
roga (Tinogasta, UCR) points out: 
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the last day there are people who pay for votes, with money. […] 
And yes, that can turn an election – even more so in a town where 
the difference between parties is small, 60 or 100 votes. 
Making cash payments at polling stations or using “chain votes”6 reflects 
a very personalized and immediate attempt to control the client. These 
tactics are not necessarily widespread, but I found several instances 
thereof. 
Rides to the Polls 
Salcedo describes the logistics and tactics used to achieve compliance, 
thus revealing the party organization and capacity required to mobilize 
voters: 
I saw people with little education […] they take their ID cards and 
escort them [to vote]. […] Another strategy we’ve used […] was 
to have an acquaintance go all the way to the school, to the ballot 
box, talking to him. […] It is illegal. You bring me three voters, 
and I wait for them in a predetermined place on the sidewalk 
[across from the school] (because of the police), and I talk to 
them, and perhaps those last words convince them. […] We have 
a provisory voters’ roster [padrón], in which you take the time to 
find out who is dead or unable to vote. […] And you give a roster 
to each of your party delegates [fiscal de mesa]. […] We use a 
spreadsheet, 1 to 300 and begin crossing them out, so we know 
who we need to get. We do it all day. Since someone has a roster 
in the car: “Number 31 is missing!” We go to get him and talk to 
him in the car about our childhood […]. Until two minutes to 6 
p.m., whatever else we can inside [the school]. 
With the help of (incompetent or corrupt) polling officials, people can 
vote with someone else’s identification papers – a practice that party 
workers try to avoid being affected by. It is important that party activists 
know the roster when making a final attempt to sway voters. The tactics 
they employ require a significant amount of party resources, staff, and 
                                                 
6  Precinct authorities hand out an envelope with their signatures to each voter. In 
the “chain vote” a voter introduces a counterfeit envelope in the ballot box and 
hands out the original, legitimate envelope with the official signatures to a bro-
ker outside the precinct. The broker then gives the envelope with the “correct” 
paper ballot to the next client, who in turn gets money from the broker in ex-
change for a new empty legitimate envelope from the precinct. When counting 
the votes, only one envelope will be invalid. 
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organization and, ultimately, put at least a few poor (and perhaps also 
uneducated) voters in intimidating situations. 
Infrastructure providing access to polling places is often lacking. 
The transportation logistics for election day are thus expensive, but the 
votes of people in the mountains (as few as 70–200 in some counties) are 
indeed important to many officials. Figueroa explains that “Out of 7,000, 
400 are given rides. […] But those 400 can decide the election.” Deputy 
Burgos recalls:  
we rent three 4x4 trucks. We have to bring them [people] things 
[…] all the food. We gather them in just one locality. There are no 
roads. [We rode] On horseback, ARS 200 for each horse. It is ex-
pensive because of the campaign. […] We have to go one week 
prior [to the election]. […] we use our own resources. ARS 7,000 
each bus from Tucumán to Santa María [Burgos’s county]. 
Burgos points out that elections are close, and that they once lost by a 
mere 100 votes. 
Describing the details of election day mobilization in a more urban 
setting, Mayor Jalile (Valle Viejo, UCR) explains that “Each broker has a 
personal roster of 30 people, and the mayor provides gasoline and/or 
cars for those going to vote.” Well-organized parties, such as the PJ and 
UCR in Catamarca, have a clear idea of the number of votes they get this 
way. 
In Argentina it is very common for parties to help voters’ reach 
polling stations by giving them rides. These rides may be arranged one-
on-one with the client or collectively by a local broker. Clients experi-
ence different degrees of intimidation when accepting (or refusing) rides 
from brokers. It is not just a feeling of gratitude that makes clients fulfill 
the exchange; the physical proximity between brokers and clients also 
plays a role. 
Body Searches (Clients as Property) 
[Elections] are fought, to the last vote. […] Two years ago, we 
won the [Provincial] Senate race by one vote. […] I may not be a 
fair player […] it is difficult […] but people [rival activists] come 
from out of town, stand at the [school] door, and take people’s 
ballots and replace them with theirs. […] They scuffle. […] Our 
militants ensure that does not happen to us. You have to protect 
them [voters] so it does not happen to you […] the people that we 
bring […]. It happened here that they gave ARS 20 per vote, up to 
ARS 50; however, they didn’t do well. […] It’s all about the trust 
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and security they [voters] have. […] Nobody is left unattended; we 
get the last person [to give her or him a ride]. […] We even find 
the 70-year-olds, get them, and wait until they come out [from 
voting]. (Mayor Saavedra, PJ, Los Varela) 
In order to enforce clientelistic exchanges in rural areas, the logistics 
have to be considered – such as having local brokers pick up voters from 
distant homes. Saavedra refers to the people his party brought to vote as 
if they were his property. 
Burgos said, “Our brokers inspect them to make sure they do not 
have other parties’ ballots.” Party activists are careful to lead people as 
close to the voting booth as possible. For example, they make sure that 
men do not carry their ballots in see-through shirt pockets so that their 
votes remain secret and are not declared invalid. Moreover, due to the 
competitiveness of rural elections and the lower education levels of rural 
voters (who can be influenced with less resources), party activists are 
vigilant and even intrusive of voters’ privacy. This is not an uncommon 
CET. 
Formosa: Ensuring Loyalty through Persuasion 
Formosa had high levels of poverty and noncompetitive elections (see 
appendix). The seeds of personalized clientelism are planted and tended 
by patrons and bear fruit in elections. Campaigns in Formosa only prac-
tice machine clientelism as a tradition; in most cases it does not influence 
election outcomes. Elected officials tend to keep benefits flowing to the 
electorate in order to reinforce loyalty. Officials are directly accountable 
to their community and must keep their support base happy if they do 
not wish to see their legitimacy and leadership challenged. In small towns 
people know mayors personally and do not want to talk to anyone who 
does not have the power to help them. An important feature of this 
relationship is the personal bond that is created. Besides supporting the 
cult of personality in such towns, it also nurtures clientelism between 
constituents and mayoral electoral machines.  
Cultivating Loyalty  
Today there were three urgent cases that had to travel to Formosa 
[city’s hospital 300 kilometers away]. I had to give them a solution, 
a subsidy that they pay back later. When they return [from the 
hospital], we will buy them their medications. […] On giving out 
food and supplies […] If it is during the campaign, I don’t go out 
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to do it; I have my people for that. […] They say they come in the 
name of the mayor. You can match the quantity of things; the dif-
ference is if they believe in you. (Mayor Meza, PJ, Las Lomitas) 
The indigenous people […] visit the party offices […] to get 
things, but you don’t know whom they vote for afterward. Inside 
their community there are people that answer to and identify with 
us. But you can’t obligate them; you have to persuade them. And 
you aren’t going to do that on the day of the election; you have to 
do it over time. (Mayor Brígnole, PJ, El Colorado)  
In short, people go where they can get the most benefits, but there is a 
pre-existing trust between an incumbent mayor and the electorate that is 
difficult for rival candidates to counter. The loyalty and reciprocity cli-
ents give in return for the benefits received or promised are the conse-
quence of multiple satisfactory interactions. Loyalty, specifically, requires 
a long-term investment on the part of party operatives (usually brokers 
or local patrons). The resultant reciprocity reflects the client’s recogni-
tion of the legitimacy of the broker and/or patron. Therefore, a mayor 
needs a network of brokers in situ to report back on and manage the 
mayor’s standing in the community. 
Giving Rides and Hosting Clients 
Some voters live up to 70 kilometers away from the polling stations, and 
thus rides have to be organized by the political parties several days prior. 
Rain can be an insuperable hazard to voters because dirt roads become 
impassable. Parties arrange to bring people days ahead of time, house 
and feed them at school gyms, and – of course – provide them with their 
paper ballots. Even if the election in question is not a mayoral contest, it 
is still the mayor who coordinates this campaign effort. Mayor Oviedo 
(San Francisco de Laishí, PJ) stressed that the “forty small cars and fif-
teen pickup trucks” used by the PJ were “all private vehicles” and that 
no municipality vehicles were used for the party’s benefit. For many 
people, simply going to town for the day means a chance to get a free 
ride and food; it is a sort of festive event. 
In 2003 an investigative reporter alleged to have “uncovered” evi-
dence of illegal campaign practices during the electoral processes in sev-
eral of the poorer provinces in Argentina (Clarín 2003). One claim in the 
report was that candidates contesting the 19 October 2003 election in 
Lugones, Formosa, collected more than 150 poor natives from the rural 
areas and kept them in warehouses for up to two days before the elec-
tion. They were purportedly given ballots that were individually folded in 
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a certain way so that their compliance could be determined by campaign-
ers during the vote count. According to the report, people were prom-
ised money, food, or cheap roofing materials for their houses. Referring 
to this topic, Mayor Meza said that “The municipality brings them water, 
the plans [government subsidies],7 etc. They want to vote, but you have 
to go get them.” Interestingly, PJ officials see this as something of a 
noble act, as these poor people – many of whom do not speak Spanish – 
would probably not vote otherwise. Neither the market nor political 
parties (besides the Peronist PJ) reach these people. The personal contact 
the mayor has with voters, their familiarity with him, their general aware-
ness of his virtual monopoly on resources, and, again, the mayor’s dis-
play of assets and coordination during the election process probably 
intimidate voters and signal an inevitability about the electoral outcome.  
In many rural areas of Argentina political parties arrange to host 
people who live far away from polling stations. A feeling of gratitude for 
this service (benefit) may be present, but the intimidation created by the 
situation is evident: party operatives pick people up from their homes 
and feed and house them in an unfamiliar place. In such a context, bro-
kers and patrons project a sense of control; and clients, of dependence. 
Thus, it stands to reason that clients might feel they are being watched. 
Santa Cruz: The Incidence of Patronage 
Deputy Omar Hallar (UCR): What happened with [former gover-
nor] Kirchner is that he used political clientelism very well. Look, 
this province – which has 200,000 people – pays 45,000 salaries: 
public employees, be they provincial, national, municipal; retirees 
of those three branches […] If you multiply by 4, it means there is 
                                                 
7  The plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar was a nationally funded program that gave ARS 
150 (USD 50) per month to underprivileged adult applicants with children. Re-
cipients were required to work four to six hours daily. However, the initiative 
was called into question due to officials’ discretional use of it. In August 2006 
there were 45,473 beneficiaries in Formosa (1 in 10 of any age). In the town of 
Las Lomitas, which has a population of 10,354, there were 1,505 recipients (1 
in 7 of any age). There, there were 24 beneficiaries with the last name “Palo-
mo” (Source: Ministerio de Trabajo). This shows how mayors give subsidies to 
underprivileged indigenous families in their areas. Mayor Meza of Las Lomitas 
said that he preferred to give some people subsidies and not have them work 
for the municipality (because they would simply be “in the way of things”) or in 
their communities (because they are “impossible to control” or “it is in their 
culture not to work”). For more on the clientelistic use of a national program at 
the municipal level, see Weitz-Shapiro (2012). 
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a public employee in each family. […] The only, quote, unquote 
“industry” is public administration. They did not want to change 
that. […] Why? Because it is easier to hold people who are tied to 
a [government] salary, a [government] subsidy, to a house built by 
the state, public employment. Those people are above the poverty 
line, they don’t need handouts to survive, but they need it to live 
because they don’t want to work. They want to continue receiving, 
and Kirchner understood that very well and got three terms in of-
fice. […] And then what happens? They [public employees] know 
that during elections if they don’t vote for the one who appointed 
them, who hired them… 
Interviewer: Are those people threatened? 
Hallar: No, the system leads you to that. 
Interviewer: Do they fear losing their job? 
Hallar: Of course. […] Kirchner carried out public works projects 
[…] the port […] but nothing that actually changes people’s lives: 
industry, economic development. 
In Santa Cruz relatively low-paid public employees who are seemingly 
tied to the administration are susceptible to pressure to support the in-
cumbent administration. However, these employees have not necessarily 
been explicitly threatened by “patrons,” most likely because a state/ 
government job or subsidy is “the most secure option they have” (Depu-
ty Aguiar, PJ). According to “Quique” Campaña, the UCR’s senior pro-
vincial legislative advisor, “most people buy, sell, or work for the state 
and speaking against it can mean isolation.” Paraphrasing different inter-
viewees, basically all the jobs in Santa Cruz’s towns are tied to the gov-
ernment one way or another. And commerce is tied to the salaries of 
public employees, while the media is tied to government sponsorship. 
The towns themselves are tied to the money coming from the provincial 
government. 
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Demanding Clients 
Most accounts reveal that it is the voters who ask for government jobs 
and expect and demand solutions to their problems.8 Interviewees im-
plied that there is a local culture that is also being fueled by people mov-
ing from other provinces. For example, Councilman Saa (UCR, Río 
Gallegos), complained that Santa Cruz:  
is a province with too much public employment and has little pri-
vate business. […] There are people without problems who ask 
for things […] there are many foreigners who make the most of 
this situation – not foreigners, but people not from this province, 
from the north [i.e., the rest of Argentina], looking for jobs, look-
ing for subsidies and government help. It’s not their fault. I be-
lieve that somehow we have accustomed them to those ways.  
Mayor Roquel (UCR, Río Gallegos) appeared to agree, saying that Santa 
Cruz is: 
A state that generally has acted with a focus on welfare and, I 
don’t want to generalize, but there are people who are accustomed 
to that. 
Appalled by the clientelism in place, Deputy Hallar (UCR) said that: 
People come here […] [and expect] that the state must give them 
a house […] a job […] a bag of food. […] Anyone who comes 
here to the province; they also want to leave their job because of 
the retirement. It is far better to have a retirement from the prov-
ince than from the national state or from a private employer.  
Councilwoman Reynoso (PJ, Caleta Olivia) expressed a similar senti-
ment, claiming that: 
People want to be municipal workers. […] work 6 hours sitting in 
a place […] And they want a job for life. They want to sit in one 
spot and retire. 
These and other officials not quoted here seem to agree that having a 
wealthy provincial state and a weakly diversified economy becomes an 
incentive for people to flock to a “sugar daddy state.” Patronage has 
                                                 
8  For example, in 2009 a group of unemployed protestors climbed a public water 
tower and threatened to jump if they did not receive jobs – which is not an un-
common tactic. The local government agreed to find the men jobs with oil 
companies and provide the women with paid training of some sort, among 
other benefits (El Patagónico 2009 and Tiempo Sur 2009). 
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been used for years to keep social peace and standards of living, which 
eventually bears fruit in elections.9  
CETs in Patronage 
Most people end up being employees of municipalities or of local 
branches of [the Departments of] Public Services or Provincial 
Roads. Everything relates to the state, especially in small towns 
where commerce depends on the state. (Councilman Naim, PJ, 
Río Gallegos) 
Clientelism mostly takes the form of patronage and generally affects low-
paid public employees, such as police officers, teachers, municipal work-
ers, and any other employee whose position depends on political ap-
pointment. The tactics used in the patronage strategy are very subtle at 
times and do not necessarily occur with greater frequency during elec-
toral campaigns. For example, keeping employees as “hires” (contratados) 
rather than full-time workers (de planta) ensures there are no unions in-
volved, no binding contracts, and no major benefits paid and leads em-
ployees to hope that they will eventually secure full-time status if the 
right party wins the election. Another example concerns schoolteachers, 
where raises are given as “bonuses” instead of as part of the formal sala-
ry and thus are not used to calculate retirement benefits. Another tactic 
used to control the labor force is to reward good monthly work attend-
ance (presentismo) – for example, 50 percent more pay for that month. 
This tactic is used to discipline the labor force and weakens unions by 
making strikes significantly financially costly for employees.  
The big oil companies in the district financially contribute to many 
of the government programs that aid the unemployed because doing so 
helps prevent protests and road closures, which would interrupt the 
running of their very profitable businesses. Patronage is thus needed to 
keep the “social peace” in a relatively more organized and mobilized civil 
society than Formosa or Catamarca.10  
                                                 
9  The percentage of the Santa Cruz population (of any age) with a provincial or 
local government job is 11.8 percent. In Mendoza it is 4.8 percent; in Formosa, 
7.9 percent; and in Catamarca, 9.4 percent. These figures do not include jobs 
with public companies or official banks. Source: ASAP, based on data from Se-
cretarías de Hacienda y de Asuntos Universitarios, Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fis-
cal con las Provincias and INDEC. 
10  Nevertheless, large-scale protests occur, with significant consequences to the 
provincial state. For example, the lack of production caused by day 13 of a 19-
day strike by oil workers was costing the province, on average, “USD 580,000 a 
day in oil royalties, and some USD 150,000 from gas,” which represented “20 
  148 Carlos M. Lisoni 
 
CETs are public policy measures or widespread threats applied by 
incumbent parties to strengthen a sense of asymmetry between them and 
their clients and to often induce compliance from public employees. 
CETs can be applied to large groups of employees (e.g., teachers or mu-
nicipal workers) or smaller groups (e.g., municipal bus drivers). Usually, 
jobs, salaries, or other benefits are on the line for the clients. In Santa 
Cruz the state apparatus is used to threaten and/or punish public em-
ployees. 
Mendoza: Coercion and Patronage 
Mendoza is a district with a high level of socioeconomic development 
and competitive elections. Officials from the three major parties seem to 
agree that patronage is carried out at the municipal level. But on the 
question of how relevant it is to electoral outcomes, Peronist deputy 
Guillermo Carmona (PJ) said: 
it is pretty determinant of the [party internal] election results. […] 
In the general election, it has a smaller impact […] [because] peo-
ple are required to vote, and hence it is less feasible to control 
who people vote for. 
Clientelism’s relevance is limited in general elections in Mendoza given 
the small proportion of people who are poor or dependent on govern-
ment employment or benefits. Clientelistic tactics can also be adopted by 
opposition candidates backed by resource-rich districts/cities in a com-
petitive province. Mayors, in particular, count on patronage tactics af-
fecting public employees and financially dependent local NGOs. In larg-
er cities this job is delegated to other actors, such as city councilpeople, 
but also loses relevance and reach given the prevalence of other cam-
paign tactics (e.g., the use of the media). Decentralized decision-making 
and the minimal importance of clientelism in general election campaigns 
translate into limited party logistics and resources dedicated to clien-
telism (see Lisoni 2012). 
  
                                                                                                    
percent of the monthly salaries paid by the provincial state” (La Opinión Austral 
2009). 
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CETs in Mendoza 
The pressure put on public employees can vary from a public endorse-
ment of a candidate by their bosses to explicit intimidation. According to 
Carmona, there was a: 
case of public employees who were visited in their homes to warn 
them […] on behalf of municipal authorities […] that they had to 
quit our party faction or they risked being moved, having their po-
sitions changed, etc. Those cases exist.  
These clientelistic practices are used by the UCR, PJ, and Partido 
Demócrata (PD). 
Carmona explains that party delegates (fiscales de mesa) coerce public 
employees and monitor their votes by marking their voter envelopes 
with a different signature: 
In this way they [party leaders] can verify how many municipal 
employees voted for the incumbent list and whether someone 
voted otherwise. They can then use the roster to try to figure out 
who voted for opposition candidates.11  
Councilman Ramírez (PJ) gives another example of the tactics of intimi-
dation used against public employees and subsidy recipients:  
The last week, […] when it seemed that the Peronists were going 
to win, they held meetings with all the public employees and told 
them “You either help us win or we have from October [election] 
to December [inauguration] […] to fire all of you.”  
Ramírez explains that when a beneficiary of a subsidy “goes to sign the 
daily attendance sheet, they remind him that if they do not win, he will 
not keep the subsidy.” 
Through meetings, telephone calls, and other types of explicit mes-
sages, individuals and groups of clients receive various threats (e.g., los-
ing their jobs or being relocated to a different place or job) if the patron 
loses the election. Needless to say, intimidation and being watched are 
factors in this case. Accusations of patronage in the local administration 
of national subsidies cross party lines.  
  
                                                 
11  There are about 300 electors registered to each precinct. The precinct authority 
(presidente de mesa) and party delegates later open each envelop and register each 
vote. 
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NGO Patronage  
In Mendoza’s larger cities mayors would meet with civil society organiza-
tions instead of doing the door-to-door work during campaigns (a task 
for city council candidates). Deputy Morales (PJ) explained that during 
the election, pressure or control is exerted:  
not only over public employees. You must realize that a munici-
pality is a network of services, assistance, relationships with agri-
cultural producers, businesspeople, and in a given time all that sets 
in motion. The mayor can request the vote from a union, an 
NGO, whatever. And all those little structures mobilize in favor 
of him.  
A mayor can reach out to cash-strapped civil society organizations to 
pressure them to commit to her or him prior to elections. Deputy Car-
mona points out that:  
Local NGOs, […] neighborhood associations, clubs are given 
conditions and control is tightened on them. Civil society organi-
zations that have some [financial] relationship with a municipal 
program can be brought to one political side by putting conditions 
on them. In some cases – particularly the neighborhood associa-
tions, the sporting clubs – they are told “Well boys, if you do not 
support us, you lose such and such a benefit, such and such a sub-
sidy.” 
Measuring CET Intrusiveness 
In this section I focus on the degree to which CETs intrude upon a 
client’s autonomy. The intrusiveness of such tactics is made up of two 
parameters: degree of personalization and degree of coercion (i.e., physi-
cal constraint and/or intimidation). First, anonymous clients have more 
autonomy, ceteris paribus, than those singled out by the clientelistic 
machine. I rated the degree of CET personalization on a scale of 0 to 2 
with 0 being anonymous and 2 being personalized. A value of 1 repre-
sents partial personalization, such as being identified as part of a group. I 
ask whether the political party’s tactic is directed to all recipients of a 
particular “benefit.” Can the political party machine identify or individu-
alize the particular client?  
The second parameter has to do with how coercive or persuasive 
the tactics are. I see persuasion as being a nonphysical constraint (e.g., 
implicit threats of negative consequences for noncompliant clients) and, 
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perhaps more importantly, also including positive appeals to the patron 
for reciprocity. I then rate the persuasion–coercion parameter on the 
same scale, with 0 being no threat, no physical constraint, and/or no 
intimidation; 1 being mild threat or physical constraint; and 2 being 
physical threat, constraint, and/or intimidation. To determine this, I 
examine whether the patron/broker appeals for the client’s reciprocity or 
to the client’s loyalty to or familiarity with the patron/broker in order to 
achieve compliance. I also look at whether the patron/broker explicitly 
points out the negative consequences for the patron losing the election 
or for clients not supporting the patron. 
Thus, the intrusiveness of a given CET becomes a two-digit rating, 
one for each parameter. When combined, intrusiveness is measured from 
0 to 4 (table 4). The list of actual CETs in table 4 is certainly not exhaus-
tive, and the tactics’ intrusiveness rankings are informed calculations 
based on my personal observations and interviews. Future research will 
require that the two parameters are operationalized according to data 
availability. Still, I am able to make a number of observations here. 
Table 4. Operationalization of CETs’ Intrusiveness to Achieve Compliance 
  Degree of Personalization  
  0: Anonymous 1: Group 2: Individual 
 0: Emotio-
nal / non-
physical 
0;0 
Loyalty / 
reciprocity (C, 
F, SC) 
0;1 
Loyalty / reci-
procity (Santa 
Cruz, C, F) 
0;2 
Loyalty / 
reciprocity (C, 
F) 
 
Degree 
of Coer-
cion 
1: Mild 
1;0 
Patronage 
Enforcement 
Policies (PEP) 
(Santa Cruz, 
M) 
1;1 
PEP (M) / Rides 
(C, F) 
1;2 
Rides (C, F) / 
Threats (Men-
doza) 
 
2: Physical / 
threat of 
such 
2;0 
N/A 
2;1 
Hosting / thre-
ats (Formosa) 
2;2 
Threats / body 
searches / cash 
on site (Cata-
marca)  
Note:  The tactics presented in the cells represent actual accounts from this study in 
the provinces of Catamarca (C), Formosa (F), Mendoza (M), and Santa Cruz 
(SC).  
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Discussion 
Clientelistic relationships between political parties and voters are con-
tracts in which clients are expected to reward patrons with their votes. 
This article revealed differences in clientelistic practices and on this basis 
has made some tentative conclusions. For example, political parties in 
competitive districts (e.g., Catamarca and Mendoza) are less confident 
that their clients will fulfill their part of the bargain due to the challenges 
presented by rival parties. Therefore, parties that invest in clients in 
competitive districts will resort to more coercive measures to enforce 
compliance, ceteris paribus, than will those in less competitive districts. 
Thus clientelistic bonds in competitive districts may consequently be 
more ephemeral than in noncompetitive districts, where patrons are 
unchallenged.  
In Formosa the presence of personalistic leaders and reciprocity ac-
count for clients’ compliance. Yet, the specific mechanisms used by 
dominant parties to enforce clientelistic exchanges still require substan-
tial resources and organizational capacity in instances where obtaining 
high vote shares becomes necessary to revalidate patrons’ legitimacy (i.e., 
a modern patrimonial relationship concomitant with democratic institu-
tions).12 
This article provides evidence that political parties engaged in clien-
telism may in fact resort to tactics designed to enforce clients’ compli-
ance with the clientelistic contract. These CETs range from acts that 
generate a willingness to reciprocate to acts that are fairly coercive and 
sometimes violent. The differences between CETs and, hence, the dif-
ferences between party–client relationships revealed here call for greater 
discernment of the role of patrons and brokers, on the one hand, and the 
legitimacy of clientelism in many communities, on the other. 
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Persuasión y coerción en la permuta clientelar: un estudio de cua-
tro provincias argentinas  
Resumen: ¿Cómo hacen los partidos políticos para garantizar la permu-
ta clientelar? Esta nota de investigación respalda empíricamente un catá-
logo de las tácticas utilizadas por los partidos políticos para asegurarse la 
obediencia de sus clientes. Además, sugiere que observando el grado de 
personalización de las tácticas y de las condiciones impuestas sobre los 
votantes individuales, podremos evaluar cuan intrusas son estas tácticas 
y, en el proceso, sanear la distancia existente entre teorías instrumentalis-
tas y aquéllas de reciprocidad clientelar. La evidencia presentada proviene 
de 73 entrevistas a políticos en ejercicio del orden local y provincial. 
Cuan persuasivas o coercitivas son las tácticas utilizadas por partidos 
políticos para asegurarse la obediencia de los clientes, tendrá implicancias 
en la evaluación que tengamos sobre la legitimidad de la relación cliente-
lar y el rol mismo de los patrones y mediadores. 
Palabras clave: Argentina, política subnacional, clientelismo, monitoreo 
de clientes  
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Appendix 
Table 5.  Population Traits (%) and Formosa Governor’s Election, 19 Octo-
ber 2003 
County Rural 
Pop. 
NBI 
2001 
Native 
Pop. 
# of 
Voters 
% PJ % 
UCR 
Matacos 21.64 51.4 50 5,175 93.84 5.82
Ramón 
Lista 100 84.6 65 3,547 88.69 10.34 
Bermejo 100 65 38 5,146 88.26 11.24
Pilagás 100 35.9 3 8,788 82.86 15.51
Pilcoma-
yo 32.37 29 3 34,808 82.32 15.86 
Laishí 77.32 40.3 8 8,405 72.76 26.24
Patiño 42.64 41.2 19 30,711 71.29 27.04
Formosa 7.46 25.8 1 89,899 66.16 27.18
Pirané 40.75 36.6 2 29,127 65.91 32.65
Note:  Unsatisfied basic needs (NBIs). “Rural population” consists of conglomerates 
of less than 2,000 people.  
Source:  INDEC, Ministerio del Interior; Government of Formosa. 
 
